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Children and adolescents often are faced with the decision to 
help others at some cost to themselves. Many times, these deci-
sions are difficult because they arise in situations in which formal 
external guidelines are absent or unclear. Decisions in those con-
texts have been the focus of researchers interested in prosocial 
moral reasoning (i.e., reasoning about moral dilemmas in which 
one person’s needs or desires conflict with those of needy oth-
ers in a context in which the role of prohibitions, authorities’ dic-
tates, and formal obligations are minimal or absent; Eisenberg, 
1986; see Rest, 1983).
According to Eisenberg (1986), developmental changes in 
prosocial moral reasoning are somewhat consistent with devel-
opmental changes in justice-oriented, Kohlbergian (Colby, Kohl-
berg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) moral reasoning. This similar-
ity is due to the role of cognition as a necessary but not sufficient 
factor for some types of moral reasoning. However, Esienberg 
(Esienberg & Shell, 1986); Eisenberg et al., 1987) has argued and 
presented some supportive evidence that individuals’ level of pro-
social moral reasoning, within the limits of their sociocognitive 
competence, varies as a function of personal (e.g., sympathetic 
tendencies) and contextual (e.g., cost of helping) factors. Follow-
ing this argument, social contextual factors such as culture might 
be expected to influence level of prosocial moral reasoning de-
pending on the values and socialization emphases in the culture. 
Furthermore, because education and logical skills appear to be as-
sociated with level of moral reasoning (Colby et al., 1983; Eisen-
berg, 1986), differences in educational experiences may result in 
cross-cultural variations in prosocial moral reasoning (particu-
larly at the highest levels).
Consistent with cognitive developmental theory, research-
ers frequently have found that the sophistication of moral judg-
ment increases during adolescence, presumably due in part to an 
increase in perspective taking and reflective abstract cognitive 
skills (Colby et al., 1983; Eisenberg, 1986; Rest, 1983; Selman, 
1980). In a series of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies on 
children and adolescents from the United States, Eisenberg and 
her colleagues have found several age-related changes in sev-
eral types of prosocial moral reasoning (Eisenberg, Carlo, Mur-
phy, & Van Court, 1995; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & 
Shea, 1991). For example, when an interview measure of proso-
cial moral reasoning was used, judgments regarding gaining the 
approval of others and global, stereotyped notions about good or 
bad behaviors tended to increase in adolescence until between the 
ages of 13–14 and 15–16 years, and then decreased somewhat in 
frequency. In contrast, self-reflective perspective taking and in-
ternalized norms judgments tend to emerge in late childhood and 
increase through adolescence (Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg 
et al., 1995). In addition, researchers interested in the motives for 
prosocial behaviors have presented a pattern of findings that is 
similar and consistent with the aforementioned pattern. For exam-
ple, intrinsic (e.g., internalized or other-oriented) motives for pro-
social behavior appear to be relatively high during adolescence in 
industrialized European societies such as Germany, Italy, and Po-
land (Boehnke, Silbereisen, Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Palmonari, 
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1989), as well as in other countries such as Israel (Bar-Tal, Raviv, 
& Lewis-Levin, 1980; Raviv, Bar-Tal, & Lewis-Levin, 1980).
At present, there is relatively little cross-cultural research on 
prosocial moral reasoning. Nonetheless, some research suggests 
that the prosocial moral reasoning of elementary school children 
and adolescents is similar (although relatively small differences 
have been found) across various industrialized societies (Eisen-
berg, 1986; Eisenberg, Boehnke, Schuler, & Silbereisen, 1985). 
For example, Israeli kibbutz children expressed more concern 
with the humaneness of recipients and internalized norms and 
laws than Anglo-Americans or Israeli city children (Fuchs, Eisen-
berg, Hertz-Lazarowitz, & Sharabany, 1986). Furthermore, in 
one study on prosocial moral reasoning in a non-Western, non in-
dustrialized culture, researchers found that adolescents from two 
Maisan coastal communities in Papua New Guinea verbalized 
virtually no higher-level internalized, stereotypic, or sympathetic 
moral reasoning (Eisenberg, 1986), although such reasoning is 
found in adolescents from Western and industrialized communi-
ties. Instead, the Papua New Guinea adolescents used substan-
tial amounts of reasoning based on the needs of others, concern 
with assisting others connected or liked by one’s self, and prag-
matic concerns. These types of reasoning presumably reflect the 
personal ties and interactions and the collectivist orientation of 
their society (Tietjen, 1986). In brief, prosocial moral reasoning 
appears to be similar in the few industrialized societies examined 
thus far. However, cultural factors do seem to influence the fre-
quency and report of some types of reasoning across Western and 
non-Western societies.
Brazilians, particularly from the southern region, in many re-
spects are perhaps the most Westernized people in Latin America 
(Poppino, 1973). 1 The southern region of Brazil is the country’s 
most populous region and is a center for manufacturing, agricul-
ture, and technology. In this region, approximately 80% of the 
workforce earns more than the region’s minimum wage, infant 
mortality rates are about a third lower than in the northeast re-
gion of Brazil, and most children stay in school at least through 
the fourth grade (Lang, 1988). According to Hofstede (1982), on 
the whole, Brazil ranks close to the United States on the mascu-
linity–femininity dimension (i.e., relative importance of advance-
ment, earnings, and recognition). In addition, some researchers 
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) have found that judgment of mores 
about specific affect-laden issues generally were comparable be-
tween individuals from this region of Brazil and a sample of in-
dividuals from the United States; social mores varied more as a 
function of socioeconomic status than culture. Nonetheless, there 
is evidence that Brazilian society is oriented toward collectivism 
(i.e., less personal time and freedom, more dependency on a sys-
tem) and personal and interpersonal relationships to a greater de-
gree than the majority of society in the United States (Botenmpo, 
Lobel, & Triandis, 1990; Hofstede, 1982).
An emphasis on collectivism and interpersonal relationships 
in Brazilian society might be reflected in some modes of proso-
cial moral reasoning, including generalized reciprocity reason-
ing (i.e., the belief that helping would benefit everyone) or af-
fectional relationship reasoning (i.e., consideration of the existing 
relationship with the needy individual). Presumably, some social-
ization practices in Brazil would be aimed at promoting and nur-
turing collectivism and personal ties and contact. Consistent with 
this notion, Biaggio (1976) found that Brazilians scored high on 
Kohlbergian Stage 3 (i.e., concern with interpersonal relation-
ships) moral reasoning. However, note that generalized reciproc-
ity reasoning, in contrast to Stage 3 in Kohlberg’s moral reason-
ing scheme, is a high-level mode of prosocial moral reasoning. 
Moreover, there is some evidence (Botenmpo et al., 1990) that 
Brazilians (from Rio De Janeiro) may behave prosocially with-
out much concern for self-presentation (i.e., they appear to be in-
trinsically motivated). In summary, we know little concerning the 
preferred modes of prosocial moral reasoning in Brazilians when 
compared directly to individuals from the United States. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to predict whether generalized reciprocity 
and other high-level modes of prosocial moral reasoning would 
be more preferred by Brazilians or individuals from the United 
States.
Gender is another social category that has been linked to indi-
vidual differences in prosocial moral reasoning. This issue is im-
portant in order to address claims (e.g., Gilligan, 1982) that there 
are cultural biases in moral reasoning. To date, however, the an-
swer to this question remains relatively unclear (see Baumrind, 
1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shea, 
1989; Walker, 1991). Eisenberg(Eisenberg et al., 1989) and others 
(Gilligan, 1982) have theorized that gender-specific socialization 
practices may lead to gender differences in care-oriented modes 
of moral reasoning. Indeed, in adolescence, girls sometimes have 
expressed more higher level, other-oriented modes of prosocial 
moral reasoning (e.g., perspective taking and internalized affect 
about consequences-type reasoning; Eisenberg et al., 1995), al-
though this pattern seemed stronger in early rather than late ado-
lescence (see Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1995). Fur-
thermore, adolescent girls have exhibited somewhat higher moral 
reasoning overall than have adolescent boys (Eisenberg et al., 
1989; Eisenberg et al., 1995).
In research with a paper-and-pencil measure of prosocial 
moral reasoning, some gender differences also have been found. 
For example, girls from the United States score higher on inter-
nalized moral reasoning and lower on approval-oriented than do 
boys (Eisenberg et al., 1995) and also score higher than boys on 
stereotypic reasoning (Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992). Be-
cause of the similarities between Anglo-American and Brazil-
ian societies in gender roles (Hofstede, 1982), we anticipated that 
Brazilian adolescents might display gender differences similar to 
those in the U.S. sample.
To date, most of the research on prosocial moral reasoning has 
been conducted using interview measures of moral reasoning. 
However, Carlo et al. (1992) recently introduced a paper-and-
pencil measure of prosocial moral reasoning (the prosocial rea-
soning objective measure, or PROM) designed to examine pro-
social moral reasoning in adolescence. As pointed out by these 
and other researchers (e.g., Gibbs et al., 1984; Kurtines & Pimm, 
1983; Rest, 1983), paper-and-pencil measures of moral reasoning 
have been designed to assess the individual’s ability to choose 
among alternative moral viewpoints, a skill that is related, but dis-
tinct, from spontaneously producing, elaborating, and defending 
moral viewpoints (as in interview measures). Paper-and-pencil
1 Some authors have raised concerns on the use of global, stereo-
typic terms (e.g., collectivism and Westernized) to describe culture. 
These terms were used with the knowledge that there are wide varia-
tions on psychological variables within cultures.
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measures facilitate verification of standardized administration, 
enhance comparability of findings across studies, and may require 
less verbal skills than interview measures. The benefits of paper-
and-pencil measures may be particularly evident when conduct-
ing studies in different countries and in applied settings.
In summary, based on social and economic similarities be-
tween specific regions of Brazil and the United States and on the 
cognitive prerequisites for prosocial moral reasoning, we hypoth-
esized that the pattern of age-related changes in prosocial moral 
reasoning for Brazilian children and adolescents would be sim-
ilar to that of U.S. children and adolescents. Furthermore, girls 
were expected to score higher on other-oriented and internalized 
modes of prosocial moral reasoning (although no cultural differ-
ences in the pattern of gender differences were expected). In the 
first part of Study 1, the age- and gender-related patterns of pro-
social moral reasoning in Brazilian children and adolescents were 
examined. In the second part, the moral reasoning of Brazilian 
adolescents (aged 11 to 15 years) was compared with the moral 
reasoning of a similar age group of Anglo-American adolescents 




The participants were 271 fifth- through tenth-grade children and 
adolescents (128 male, 143 female) from private schools in a pre-
dominantly White, middle-class community in a southern city (Porto 
Alegre) of Brazil. Six students left some items blank on the ques-
tionnaire and were dropped from the main analyses. Thus, there were 
265 students (127 male, 138 female; M age = 14.6 years, SD = 1.9 
years) in the final sample. Participation in the study was voluntary, 
and the students received no material compensation for participating.
Materials
The paper-and-pencil measure of prosocial moral reasoning 
(Carlo et al., 1992) was based on a previously developed (see Eisen-
berg et al., 1987) interview measure of prosocial moral reasoning. 
The PROM was translated into Portuguese and back into English by 
a researcher who is fluent in both Portuguese and English and who is 
an expert in moral development (Silvia H. Koller). Then the PROM 
was translated back into Portuguese, and the translation was con-
firmed by a fellow researcher who is fluent in both English and Por-
tuguese. The PROM contained seven story dilemmas designed to 
invoke a conflict between the actor’s needs, wants, and desires and 
those of another (or others). The dilemmas dealt with the following 
issues: (a) choosing to get an injured child’s parents versus going to 
a friend’s party, (b) keeping food after a flood versus giving some 
food to others who had none, (c) helping disabled children strengthen 
their legs by teaching them to swim versus practicing for a swim-
ming contest to win prize money, (d) continuing to stay and play in 
one’s own backyard versus going to try and stop a bully that is pick-
ing on a peer, (e) going to the beach with friends versus helping a 
peer to study for and pass a math test, (f) donating blood to a needy 
other versus losing time and money at work and school, and (g) help-
ing a peer who is being teased versus risking rejection from peers.
The following is a sample story from the PROM (English 
version): 
One day Mary was going to a friend’s party. On the way, she 
saw a girl who had fallen down and hurt her leg. The girl asked 
Mary to go to the girl’s house and get her parents so the parents 
could come and take her to a doctor. But if Mary did run and get 
the girl’s parents, Mary would be late to the party and miss the 
fun and social activities with her friends.
The order of the PROM stories was randomized for each student, 
the protagonists were the same gender as the student, and there was a 
practice story at the beginning. After reading each story, adolescents 
were first asked to indicate whether (a) the protagonist should help 
the needy other, (b) the protagonist should not help the needy other, 
or (c) they were unsure what the protagonist should do. Following 
this decision, the students were asked to rate the importance of six 
considerations pertaining to why the protagonist should or should not 
help the needy other in the story (on a 5-point scale; 1 = not at all, 
5 = greatly). The PROM took each student about 15 to 20 min to 
complete.
A representative sampling of frequently reported prosocial moral 
reasoning choices was selected for each story. Each of the stories 
(there were seven stories) included one hedonistic item (Level 1 in 
Eisenberg’s, 1986, schema, which included simple hedonistic or di-
rect reciprocity reasoning; e.g., “It depends how much fun Mary ex-
pects the party to be and what sorts of things are happening at the 
party”; Cronbach’s α = .61), one needs-oriented item (Level 2; e.g., 
“It depends whether the girl really needs help or not”; α = .60), one 
approval-oriented item (Level 3; e.g., “It depends whether Mary’s 
parents and friends will think she did the right or she did the wrong 
thing”; α = .85), and one stereotypic item (Level 3; e.g., “It depends 
if Mary thinks it’s the decent thing to do or not”; α = .61). In addi-
tion, each of the stories contained one item that reflected higher level 
reasoning (Levels 4 and 5; i.e., sympathetic, perspective taking, in-
ternalized affect, or abstract internalized reasoning; e.g., “It depends 
how Mary would feel about herself if she helped or not”; α = .61). 
The sixth reasoning choice was a lie/nonsense item (e.g., “It depends 
whether Mary believes in people’s values of metacognition or not”). 2
Procedure
All adolescents were administered a demographic questionnaire 
and the PROM. The session lasted about 20 to 30 min and was con-
ducted in the classrooms (maximum group size of 30). Students then 
were carefully debriefed and thanked.
Scoring of the PROM
For each participant, PROM ratings that corresponded to one of 
the five types of prosocial moral reasoning were summed across the 
seven stories to obtain a frequency score. A frequency score also was 
obtained using the lie/nonsense items in the PROM; however, this 
scale was used only to assess whether students scored 2 standard de-
viations or higher on this scale (as suggested by Carlo et al., 1992), 
and no adolescents met this criterion.
As in prior studies (Carlo et al., 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1995), 
preliminary analyses using the frequency PROM scores suggested 
that there was a response bias in the use of the scale. Students tended 
to use either the lower or the higher ends of the PROM scale. Thus, 
the frequency PROM scores were transformed to proportion PROM 
scores (see Boehnke et al., 1989, for a similar procedure) by divid-
ing each of the PROM scale scores (reflecting the five types of rea-
soning) by the sum of the PROM scale scores. Conceptually, the pro-
portion scores reflect a participant’s preference for a reasoning type 
2 Both the English and Portugese versions of the PROM may be obtained 
from Gustavo Carlo on request.
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in relation to the other reasoning types. In the subsequent analyses 
of the PROM, proportion scores were used rather than frequency 
scores.
Results
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the 
PROM scales for Part 1. A series of hierarchical regression anal-
yses using prosocial moral reasoning scores as the criterion were 
conducted to assess age and gender differences in prosocial moral 
reasoning. As suggested by Aiken and West (1991), all predic-
tors were centered (by subtracting the means) before the analy-
ses to reduce nonessential multicollinearity. In each of the anal-
ysis (there were five analyses corresponding to the five prosocial 
moral reasoning scales), age and gender were entered on the first 
block and then the Age × Gender interaction vector was entered 
on the second block. 
There were significant main effects of both age and gender 
on the first step for approval-oriented, stereotypic, and inter-
nalized moral reasoning, F s (2, 262) = 19.90, 12.44, and 6.51, 
p < .001, p < .001, and p < .005 ( R2 changes = .13, .09, and 
.05), respectively. Younger children and boys scored higher on 
approval-oriented reasoning, t s(262) = −4.31 and −4.67, p < 
.001 (standardized B s = −.25 and −.27). In contrast, children 
scored higher on stereotypic and internalized reasoning as age 
increased, t s(262) = 3.05 and 2.69, p < .005 and p < .01 (stan-
dardized B s = .18 and .16), respectively, and girls scored higher 
than boys on both stereotypic and internalized reasoning, t 
s(262) = 4.00 and 2.44, p s < .001 and .02 (standardized B s = 
.24 and .15), respectively. There were no other significant main 
or interaction effects.
We conducted an additional set of analyses to examine lin-
ear and quadratic trends in prosocial moral reasoning because 
some types of reasoning have been found to show both de-
creases and increases in usage during childhood and adoles-
cence (Eisenberg et al., 1995). In these analyses, there was a 
significant Quadratic Trend × Gender interaction for hedonis-
tic moral reasoning, F(5, 259) = 3.86, p < .05 ( R2 change = 
.02 ); however, tests of the simple trends for each gender were 
not significant. There were no other significant quadratic trend 
main or interaction effects. 3
Study 1: Part 2
The second part of Study 1 was designed to directly compare 
age, gender, and cultural group differences in Brazilian and An-
glo-American adolescents’ ratings of prosocial moral reasoning.
Method
Participants
The Brazilian participants were 219 students (a subset of the sam-
ple from Study 1) matched to the U.S. sample by age (selected if age 
range was from 141 to 198 months; 106 male, 113 female; M age = 
14.2 years, SD = 1.5 years).
The students from the United States were 67 adolescent students 
(25 male, 42 female) from a prior published study on prosocial moral 
reasoning (Carlo et al., 1992). The U.S. students were selected only 
if they were between 141 months and 198 months of age (2 students 
from the original sample were dropped on the basis of this criterion; 
for the final sample, M age = 14.2 years, SD = 1.7 years). Four students 
were dropped from some analyses because they left some items on the 
PROM unanswered. The students were predominantly White, middle-
class, and from public junior high or high schools in Tempe, Arizona. 
The students received $10 (2 tenth graders received $20 in an effort to 
recruit more male students) to motivate voluntary participation.
Materials
The paper-and-pencil measure of prosocial moral reasoning 
(PROM; Carlo et al., 1992) was the same as described earlier. Al-
though the Brazilians were administered all seven stories from the 
PROM (see Part 1), only the same five stories (the first five stories 
described earlier) that were administered to the U.S. sample were 
used for analyses. The scoring procedures were the same as described 
previously. Two Brazilian boys scored 2 standard deviations above 
the mean on the lie/nonsense scale of the PROM and were dropped 
from subsequent analyses.
Procedure
As mentioned earlier, the Brazilian adolescents participated in an 
experimental session in which they completed a demographic infor-
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Prosocial Moral Reasoning by Samples in Study 1
           Part 2
       Part 1      Brazil    United States       Total
    (N = 265)    (n = 211)      (n = 63)      (N = 174)
Moral reasoning       M          SD   M   SD   M   SD   M   SD 
Hedonistic .18 .03 .18 .03 .17 .04 .18 .03
Approval  .15 .05 .15 .05 .14 .05 .15 .05
Needs-oriented .21 .03 .23 .04 .22 .04 .21 .03
Stereotyped .23 .04 .21 .03 .21 .04 .23 .04
Internalized  .24 .03 .24 .03 .26 .04 .24 .04
Note. The Brazilian sample in Part 2 is a subsample of the Brazilian sample in Part 1 selected to match the 
Anglo-American sample on age range.
3 Significant nonlinear trend interactions are a special case of moderators 
and are often difficult to detect (McClelland & Judd, 1993).
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mation sheet and the PROM questionnaire. The session lasted about 
30 min and was conducted in the classrooms (maximum group size 
of 30). The U.S. adolescents participated in two experimental ses-
sions (see Carlo et al., 1992), but only the demographic information 
and PROM questionnaire data from the first session were used in the 
present study. In this session, the demographic information and the 
PROM were administered before all other questionnaires were ad-
ministered. In both the Brazilian and Anglo-American sessions, par-
ticipating students were carefully debriefed and thanked.
Results
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the 
PROM scales for the Brazilian sample, the U.S. sample,, and the 
total sample in Part 2. A series of hierarchical regression analyses 
using prosocial moral reasoning scores as the criterion was con-
ducted to assess age, gender, and group differences in prosocial 
moral reasoning (see comparable analyses above). In each anal-
ysis, age (in months), gender, and culture group were entered in 
the first block; then all possible two-way interaction vectors were 
entered in the second block; lastly the Age × Gender × Culture 
Group interaction vector was entered in the third block.
There were significant main effects of age and culture group 
on the first step for internalized reasoning, F(3, 270) = 8.00, p < 
.001 ( R2 change = .08). Older children and U.S. children scored 
higher on internalized reasoning, t s(270) = 2.71 and 3.51, p s < 
.01 and .001 (standardized B s = .16 and .21), respectively.
There also were significant main effects of age and gender on 
the first step for approval-oriented and stereotypic moral reason-
ing, F s(3, 270) = 13.81 and 7.43, both p s < .001 ( R2 change 
= .13 and .08), respectively. Younger children and boys scored 
higher on approval-oriented reasoning, t s(270) = −4.08 and 
−4.75, p s < .001 (standardized B s = −.23 and −.27), respectively. 
In contrast, older children and girls scored higher on stereotypic 
reasoning, t s(270) = 2.56 and 3.77, p s < .01 and .001 (standard-
ized B s = .15 and .22), respectively. There were no other signifi-
cant main effects, and there were no significant two- or three-way 
interaction effects.
Discussion of Study 1
The present findings from both parts of Study 1 were gen-
erally consistent with the hypotheses and yielded several inter-
esting findings. More specifically, the age, gender, and cultural 
group differences were generally consistent with prior findings 
from studies using children and adolescents from Western and 
non-Western, industrialized countries.
Of particular interest was the one cultural group difference 
on prosocial moral reasoning in Part 2. Children from the United 
States scored higher on internalized moral reasoning compared 
with Brazilian children. This finding is somewhat consistent with 
other researchers’ findings that Brazilians score approximately 
one stage lower than Americans on Kohlbergian moral reason-
ing (Hutz, De Conti, & Vargas, 1993). Because moral reasoning 
has been found to be significantly related to education and log-
ical skills (Colby et al., 1983; Eisenberg, 1986), it may be that 
the culture difference was partly a function of these variables. Al-
though children from both samples were recruited from schools, 
there may be differences in the degree to which the educational 
systems stress critical reasoning skills that may be necessary for 
developmentally sophisticated moral reasoning.
Despite the moderate sample size in this study, there were no 
differences between U.S. and Brazilian adolescents in age or gen-
der effects on prosocial moral reasoning (i.e., there were no sig-
nificant interactions of age or gender with cultural group in Part 
2). Indeed, consistent with Eisenberg et al.’s (1995) findings, ap-
proval-oriented reasoning declined with age whereas internalized 
reasoning increased with age (in Carlo et al., 1992, internalized 
reasoning increased with age particularly for male participants). 
In addition, stereotypic reasoning increased with age in both stud-
ies. This latter finding may not be surprising given that stereo-
typic reasoning appears to increase with age sometime in mid-ad-
olescence (Eisenberg et al., 1991) before declining in frequency.
With regard to gender differences in prosocial moral reason-
ing, there were several findings of interest. Girls preferred stereo-
typic reasoning and rejected approval-oriented reasoning more 
than did boys. The former finding was consistent with the sug-
gestion that girls, compared with boys, may be more exposed 
to global, traitlike verbalizations in socialization opportunities 
(Carlo et al., 1992). It was less clear why girls did not report 
more internalized moral reasoning than boys in Part 2 of Study 1 
as in the first part and as in prior studies using the PROM (Eisen-
berg et al., 1995).
Study 2
As might be expected, prosocial moral reasoning has been the-
oretically and empirically linked to prosocial behaviors (Eisen-
berg, 1986; Underwood & Moore, 1982). The higher levels of 
prosocial moral reasoning often reflect other-oriented concerns 
with the needs of distressed individuals and are consonant with 
helpfulness and generosity toward others. Moreover, cognitively 
sophisticated individuals may be more apt to understand and con-
sider the relevant situational and personal factors necessary for 
engaging in helping behaviors (Carlo, Knight, Eisenberg, & Ro-
tenberg, 1991).
Eisenberg and her colleagues (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986; 
Eisenberg et al., 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg et al., 
1995) have found in general that prosocial behaviors are nega-
tively associated with hedonistic modes of moral reasoning and 
positively associated with needs-oriented moral reasoning and 
a composite index of moral reasoning. In addition, in one study 
(Eisenberg et al., 1995), using a paper-and-pencil measure of pro-
social moral reasoning (the PROM), researchers found a positive 
relation between a prosocial behavior aggregate and internalized 
moral reasoning and a moral reasoning composite, and a negative 
relation between the prosocial behavior aggregate and hedonistic 
moral reasoning. In contrast, self-oriented, hedonistic modes of 
reasoning have been negatively associated with prosocial behav-
iors. The present study was designed to extend the prior findings 
by examining these relations in adolescents from a country (i.e., 
Brazil) other than the United States.
To our knowledge, one published study (Eisenberg et al., 
1985) was designed to investigate the relations between prosocial 
moral reasoning and prosocial behaviors in a country other than 
the United States. In this study, German children who donated 
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candies were likely to report needs-oriented moral reasoning and 
scored relatively high on a prosocial moral reasoning composite, 
and they were less likely to report hedonistic moral reasoning. 
In addition, picking up paper clips was not significantly related 
to prosocial moral reasoning. In an unpublished study (Aykel & 
Aykel, 1991), researchers found a significant positive relation be-
tween a composite of prosocial moral reasoning (using Eisen-
berg’s, 1986, scheme) and a prosocial behavior composite using 
Turkish high school students. Furthermore, these latter research-
ers found a significant negative relation between hedonistic rea-
soning and the prosocial behavior composite and a significant 
positive relation between internalized reasoning and the prosocial 
behavior composite. In two studies on Israeli children’s motives 
for prosocial behaviors, researchers (Bar-Tal et al., 1980; Raviv 
et al., 1980) found that children’s justifications for helping others 
varied and included egoistic (some direct reciprocity), normative 
(following a social norm or expectation), and altruistic motives. 
However, in general, those children who spontaneously donated 
most were motivated primarily by higher level altruism (i.e., gen-
eralized reciprocity motives and as a result of moral convictions 
and without expectations of external rewards). In summary, the 
findings regarding the relations between prosocial moral reason-
ing or motives and prosocial behaviors in German, Israeli, and 
Turkish children generally have been consistent with findings re-
ported in studies using children from the United States.
Based on the argument that the influences of prosocial behav-
iors in Brazilian adolescents would be similar to those in adoles-
cents from the United States and on the generally consistent prior 
findings in cultures other than the United States, higher levels 
of moral reasoning (e.g., internalized) were expected to be posi-
tively related to prosocial behaviors. In contrast, self-focused, he-
donistic prosocial moral reasoning was expected to be negatively 
related to prosocial behaviors (unless there was some expectation 
of direct reciprocity from helping).
As mentioned previously, another issue of interest to research-
ers is whether moral reasoning in male and female individuals 
differs (e.g., Walker, 1991). A somewhat different approach to 
address this issue is to examine whether specific forms of moral 
reasoning are associated with masculine or feminine role char-
acteristics that are often considered culture-based (McGraw & 
Bloomfield, 1987). Based on the assumption that adolescents 
have clear stereotyped conceptions of gender roles, it may be that 
specific moral justifications are perceived as specific to a mascu-
line or feminine orientation. It is these stereotyped conceptions 
that may, in turn, influence adolescents’ reports of specific types 
of moral reasoning.
The study of gender role orientations in prosocial moral rea-
soning would be of particular interest to moral development re-
searchers because prosocial moral reasoning is oriented to-
ward caring and interpersonal relationships (Eisenberg, 1986), 
which are commonly feminine-typed concerns (Gilligan, 1982). 
Whereas there is little empirical support for the notion that gen-
der role orientation and moral reasoning are significantly re-
lated with regard to Kohlberg’s (Colby et al., 1983) justice-ori-
ented moral reasoning approach (McGraw & Bloomfield, 1987), 
there is evidence that there are gender differences in some types 
of prosocial moral reasoning (at least in early adolescence; Eisen-
berg et al., 1989). For example, by adolescence, needs-oriented, 
empathic, role-taking, and internalized prosocial moral reason-
ing sometimes are preferred by girls compared with boys. How-
ever, the relations between gender role orientations and prosocial 
moral reasoning have not been directly examined.
In brief, there is evidence that female adolescents prefer some 
types of internalized reasoning more than do male adolescents 
(Carlo et al., 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1989); that some higher lev-
els of prosocial moral reasoning include feminine-typed, emo-
tionally based modes of reasoning forms (e.g., empathic reason-
ing); and that Brazilian and U.S. societies do not appear to differ 
in emphasizing masculinity–femininity (Hofstede, 1982). Thus, 
femininity was expected to be positively related to higher level 
prosocial moral reasoning (e.g., internalized) and negatively re-
lated to lower level prosocial moral reasoning (e.g., approval-ori-




Participants were 136 adolescents (57 male, 79 female) from pri-
vate school classrooms in a southern city (Porto Alegre) of Brazil. 
The students were mostly White Brazilians recruited from a pre-
dominantly middle-class neighborhood. Of these adolescents, 6 did 
not complete one of the scales (the Sex Role Inventory) and were 
dropped from the main analyses (although their data are included 
in the preliminary analyses). Thus, there were 130 adolescents (55 
male, M age = 14.8 years, SD = 1.5 years; 75 female, M age = 15.1 
years, SD = 1.6 years) in the final sample. The students received no 
material compensation for participation.
Materials
The measure of prosocial moral reasoning. The measure of pro-
social moral reasoning (PROM; Carlo et al., 1992) that was used in 
the first study (see Part 1 of Study 1) was used in this study. As in 
Study 1, scores from the five prosocial moral reasoning scales were 
summed and then transformed to proportion scores. No students 
scored higher than 2 standard deviations above the mean on the lie/
nonsense scale. Cronbach’s alphas for the seven-item scales were 
.60, .85, .66, .71, and .64 for hedonistic, approval-oriented, needs-
oriented, stereotypic, and internalized moral reasoning, respectively.
Sex Role Inventory. An adaptation (Hutz & Koller, 1992) of 
Bem’s (Bem, 1974) 60 adjective-item sex role orientation (Bem’s 
Sex Role Inventory; BSRI) scale for use with Brazilians was used. 
The scale is composed of several subscales, including a Masculin-
ity scale (present study’s α = .80, 20 items) and a Femininity scale (α 
= .93, 20 items). As expected, preliminary correlational analyses re-
vealed that masculinity and femininity were not significantly interre-
lated, r (130) = −.05, ns. 4
Peer ratings of prosocial behavior. Students were asked to name 
their three best friends from their class. Then the students were asked 
to rate each of their classmates’ helpfulness and generosity (each 
were 7-point scales, 1 = never, 7 = almost always). Scores were 
summed and divided by the number of ratings for each student to 
obtain a score for helpfulness and generosity. Correlational analy-
sis revealed a significant positive relation between Helpfulness and 
4 Conceptually, femininity and masculinity were the constructs of inter-
est, and several theorists (e.g., Pedhazur & Tetenbaum, 1979; Taylor & Hall, 
1982) have raised serious concerns regarding the androgyny construct. Thus, 
only masculinity and femininity traits were used.
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Generosity scale scores, r (136) = .67, p < .001. Thus, a prosocial 
behavior composite was computed by summing the Helpfulness and 
Generosity scale scores, and this composite was used in the subse-
quent analyses.
Procedure
All adolescents participated in two experimental sessions that 
lasted about 30 to 45 min in their classrooms (each session had a 
maximum of 30 students). In the first session, the students were ad-
ministered the BSRI first; then the students were asked to rate their 
friends’ and fellow classmates’ dispositions to help others and to 
be giving. About a week and a half later, the students were admin-
istered the PROM. All students then were carefully debriefed and 
thanked.
Results
Tests of Sex Differences in PROM Scores, Masculinity, and 
Femininity
Means and standard deviations on prosocial moral reason-
ing are presented in Table 2. A series of univariate analyses were 
computed to assess gender differences in prosocial moral rea-
soning, masculinity, and femininity (multivariate analyses could 
not be computed because the PROM scores were multicollinear). 
There was a significant effect of gender on approval-oriented rea-
soning, F(1, 134) = 4.37, p < .05. Boys scored higher than girls 
on approval-oriented reasoning (see Table 2). There was a signif-
icant effect of gender on femininity, F(1, 128) = 78.62, p < .001. 
As expected, girls scored higher than boys: M for girls = 5.48, SD 
= 0.85, and M for boys = 4.02, SD = 1.03. There were no other 
significant effects. 5 
Relations Between Prosocial Moral Reasoning and Prosocial 
Behavior Ratings
We conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression anal-
yses to test homogeneity of slopes assumptions using the proso-
cial behavior ratings as the criterion variable. In these analyses, 
gender and prosocial moral reasoning (hedonistic, approval-ori-
ented, needs-oriented, stereotyped, or internalized) were entered 
simultaneously in the first block, and then the Gender × Prosocial 
Moral Reasoning interaction was entered in the second block. 
There were two significant interaction effects.
There was a significant Gender × Approval-Oriented Moral 
Reasoning interaction on prosocial behavior, R2 change = .04 
(over and above the contributions of the main effect vectors), 
F(1, 126) for R2 change = 5.85, p < .05 (multiple R = .27). For 
boys, approval-oriented reasoning was significantly negatively 
related to prosocial behavior (see Table 3). In addition, the Gen-
der × Needs-Oriented Moral Reasoning interaction significantly 
predicted prosocial behavior, R2 change = .05, F(1, 126) for R2 
change = 6.06, p < .05 (multiple R = .22). For boys, needs-ori-
ented reasoning was positively related to prosocial behavior (see 
Table 3). There were no other significant interaction effects. 
 We also computed zero-order correlations to assess the relations 
between the PROM and the prosocial behavior ratings across 
gender (all tests were two-tailed; see Table 3). As expected, inter-
nalized reasoning was significantly positively related to prosocial 
behavior. In contrast, hedonistic reasoning was significantly neg-
atively related to prosocial behavior. There were no other signifi-
cant relations. 6
Relations Between Gender Role Orientations and Prosocial 
Moral Reasoning
We conducted two sets of hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses to test homogeneity of slopes assumptions using pro-
social moral reasoning scores as the criterion variables. In these 
analyses, gender and gender role orientation (either masculinity 
or femininity) were entered simultaneously in the first block, and 
then the Gender × Gender Role Orientation interaction was en-
tered in the second block. There were two significant interaction 
effects (see Table 4 ) 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Prosocial Moral Rea-
soning as a Function of Gender in Study 2
     Gender
              Overall          Male                Female
             (n = 136)         (n = 57)            (n = 79)
Moral reasoning               M       SD          M      SD          M       SD
Hedonistic .18 .03 .18 .03 .18 .03
Approval .13 .04 .14 .04 .13 .04
Needs-oriented .20 .03 .20 .03 .20 .03
Stereotyped .24 .03 .23 .04 .24 .03
Internalized .25 .03 .25 .04 .26 .03
Table 3. Correlations Between Prosocial Moral Reasoning and Pro-
social Behavior Within and Across Gender in Study 2
                    Prosocial behavior
Moral reasoning       Male               Female               Total
Hedonistic –.24* –.16 –.20**
Approval –.40*** –.01                           — a
Needs-oriented .29** .14                           — b
Stereotyped .13 –.01 .07
Internalized .26* .28*** .27***
Note: n = 55 for male and n = 75 for female adolescents.
a Gender × Approval-Oriented Moral Reasoning interaction was significant.
b Gender × Needs-Oriented Moral Reasoning interaction was significant.
* p < . 10, two-tailed.    ** p < .05, two-tailed.    *** p < .01, two-tailed.
5 Correlational analyses on the relations between age and PROM, mas-
culinity, and femininity also revealed that younger adolescents scored higher 
than older adolescents on approval-oriented reasoning, r (130) = −.22, p < 
.01. There were no other significant effects.
6 Correlational analyses both across and within each gender revealed no 
significant relations between gender role orientations and prosocial behaviors. 
Results of the regression analyses were virtually identical to those presented 
when age (in months) was inserted in the first block, suggesting that age did 
not account for the relations between prosocial moral reasoning and proso-
cial behaviors.
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The Gender × Femininity Orientation interaction significantly 
predicted hedonistic reasoning, R2 change = .04 (over and above 
the contributions of the main effect vectors), F(1, 126) for R2 
change = 5.66, p < .05 (multiple R = .22. For boys, femininity 
was significantly, positively related to hedonistic reasoning (see 
Table 4). In addition, the Gender × Masculinity Orientation in-
teraction significantly predicted approval-oriented reasoning, R2 
change = .04, F(1, 126) for R2 change = 5.66, p < .05 (multiple R 
= .22). For boys, masculinity was negatively related to approval-
oriented reasoning (see Table 4).
To examine the relations between gender role orientations and 
prosocial moral reasoning across gender, we conducted zero-or-
der correlational analyses (all tests were two-tailed; see Table 4). 
As can be seen in the table, femininity was negatively related to 
approval-oriented reasoning and positively related to internalized 
reasoning. There were no other significant relations.
Discussion of Study 2
In general, the present findings were consistent with the hy-
potheses and provide additional information about the correlates 
of adolescents’ prosocial moral reasoning. As expected, several 
subscales of the paper-and-pencil measure of prosocial moral rea-
soning were significantly related to prosocial behavior. More spe-
cifically, hedonistic reasoning was negatively, and internalized 
reasoning was positively, related to peer ratings of prosocial be-
haviors. In addition, particularly for male adolescents, needs-ori-
ented moral reasoning was positively related, and approval-ori-
ented reasoning (which was frequently rejected by adolescents) 
was negatively related, to peer ratings of prosocial behaviors. 
These findings suggest that individuals who prefer other-ori-
ented and sophisticated value-laden modes of moral reasoning 
are viewed by others as generous and helpful and that individu-
als who use self-focused and self-presentational types of reason-
ing are less likely to be viewed by others as generous and helpful. 
Perhaps more important, these findings generally were consistent 
with prior findings in other cultures, including samples of U.S. 
adolescents (see introduction).
There was some support for the notion that feminine gender 
role orientation was associated with prosocial moral reasoning. 
Adolescents who reported feminine characteristics were more 
likely to prefer internalized modes of prosocial moral reasoning 
and less likely to prefer approval-oriented reasoning (interest-
ingly, as in Study 1, boys preferred approval-oriented reasoning 
more than did girls). In addition, boys (but not girls) who were 
feminine role oriented were more likely to prefer hedonistic rea-
soning. This latter finding may reflect the notion that hedonistic 
reasoning may be a viable, pragmatic way of thinking for male 
adolescents with counterstereotypic gender role preferences in a 
traditionally machismo-oriented society (there is some evidence 
that rejection of this traditional view may be occurring in Brazil; 
Hutz, Koller, & Biaggio, 1992).
Somewhat unexpectedly, there was one significant relation be-
tween masculinity and prosocial moral reasoning (but only for 
boys). Boys (but not girls) who were masculine role oriented 
were less likely to be oriented toward the approval of others. This 
finding may reflect a belief by these male adolescents that actions 
based on gaining the approval of others (including parents and the 
general community) are considered less masculine. The present 
findings regarding the relations between gender role orientations 
and prosocial moral reasoning are not necessarily incompatible 
with Walker’s (1991) or Baumrind’s (1986) analyses of gender 
differences in moral reasoning or with McGraw and Bloomfield’s 
(1987) analyses of the relations between gender role orienta-
tions and moral reasoning. Although one would expect both gen-
der and gender role orientations to be multifaceted constructs and 
to be interrelated, each construct is considered uniquely multifac-
eted. For example, some researchers (see Huston, 1983) have ar-
gued that femininity and masculinity also tap into instrumentality, 
expressiveness, agency, and communion. Furthermore, whereas 
gender differences may be considered relatively fixed and rigid, 
gender role orientations presumably are more fluid and more sen-
sitive to socialization experiences. In addition, there are distinct 
differences between Eisenberg’s and Kohlberg’s approaches not 
only with respect to the moral focus, but also in scoring methods 
(see Eisenberg, 1986); together these differences may account for 
different findings. It is clear that additional research is needed to 
further examine these issues.
General Summary and Discussion
Overall, the present findings extend our prior understand-
ing of individuals’ thinking of care-based, interpersonal-ori-
ented social dilemmas. There was further evidence that proso-
Table 4. Correlations Between Prosocial Moral Reasoning and Femininity 
and Masculinity Within and Across Gender in Study 2
   Femininity            Masculinity
Moral reasoning Male Female Total Male Female Total
Hedonistic .27** –.15 — a   .09 -.06   .02
Approval  –.21 –.17 .25***   –.35*** .08   — b   
Needs-oriented –.05 .07 .05   .21 .11   .15  
Stereotyped –.08 .14 .07   .06   –.01   .01  
Internalized .11 .18 .18** .07   –.14   -.05  
Note: n = 55 for male and n = 75 for female adolescents.
a Gender × Hedonistic Moral Reasoning interaction was significant.
b Gender × Approval-Oriented Moral Reasoning interaction was significant.
**p< .05, two-tailed.      ***p< ,01, two-tailed.
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cial moral reasoning is linked to prosocial behaviors in some 
Western cultures. Specifically, self-focused, hedonistic con-
cerns were negatively associated with helpfulness and generos-
ity, whereas abstract, other-oriented internalized concerns were 
positively associated with helpfulness and generosity. Further-
more, femininity was correlated with approval-oriented and in-
ternalized prosocial moral reasoning. Age and gender generally 
were related to prosocial moral reasoning in a theoretically ex-
pected manner and consistent with findings from U.S. samples. 
Moreover, the Portuguese version of the PROM appeared reli-
able and valid to use with Brazilian 5th to 10th graders (at least 
in a middle-class sample). Future studies designed to examine 
whether the correlates of prosocial moral reasoning are similar 
in other cultures may provide some insights about the underly-
ing structures of moral reasoning.
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